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Abstract 
 
This paper investigates the impact of specific modes of entry of foreign banks, i.e. 
greenfield investment versus merger and acquisition, on bank performance in three 
transition economies – the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland. We use stochastic 
frontier analysis to model and measure the cost efficiency of banks. We adopt a 
maximum likelihood approach to estimation in which the variance of the one-sided error 
term is modeled jointly with the cost frontier, thus enabling us to retrieve efficiency 
scores, as well as estimating the various determinants of X-inefficiency. We first find that 
foreign banks are generally more cost efficient than their domestic counterparts, a result 
that confirms those of the existing empirical literature. We then turn our focus to 
comparative performance of greenfield banks versus merger and acquisition banks 
(M&As), and of M&As versus domestic banks. The results show that on average, M&As 
are surpassed in terms of efficiency by greenfields banks, but no cost efficiency 
difference is apparent between M&As and domestic banks. However, we find a strong 
age effect with respect to M&As which suggests that the evolution of M&As’ efficiency 
follows an inverse U-shape, that means M&As tend to get more inefficient following the 
acquisition, but approximately 4 years and a haft later, their efficiency starts to improve. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The second half of the 1990s witnessed a dramatic increase of foreign participation in 
emerging markets’ banking systems. Central and Eastern European countries, especially 
the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland, witnessed the most striking changes, with 
foreign presence rising from around 10% at the end of 1994 to around 60% at the end of 
1999 (Mathieson & Roldos, 2001). The transformation of the communist mono-bank 
system into a two-tier one has led the authorities to open up the banking system to new 
entries and foreign banks have taken this opportunity to make their presence felt through 
greenfield investments. The banking crises that resulted from state-owned banks holding 
huge amounts of non-performing loans forced the governments of these countries to 
undertake vast programs of bank privatization that eventually drew in foreign banks 
through mergers and acquisitions of domestic banks. The need to comply with the 
requirements of membership in the OECD and for European Union accession has led the 
Czech, Hungary, and Poland to further removal of barriers to entry. 
 
Given the main objectives of these countries in liberalizing their banking systems are to 
promote banking efficiency and stability, it is useful to assess whether this policy has 
been effective. In this paper, we attempt to do so by looking at the comparative 
performance between the two modes of entry of foreign banks – greenfield investment 
(hereafter Greenfields) versus entry by merging with or acquiring a domestic bank
2 
(hereafter M&As), and between the M&As and domestic banks. 
 
To this end, we use stochastic frontier analysis to model and measure the cost efficiency 
of banks in three transition economies: the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland. We 
adopt a maximum likelihood approach to estimation in which the variance of the one-
sided error term is modeled jointly with the cost frontier, thus enabling us to retrieve 
efficiency scores, as well as estimating the various determinants of X-inefficiency. This 
one-stage approach gets round the recurrent criticisms inherent in the two-stage approach 
commonly adopted so far. Our preferred framework in the one-stage setting is the 
conditional mean model. We first compare the performance of foreign banks versus 
domestic banks to see whether our result confirms those of the existing empirical 
literature. We then turn our focus to the comparative cost performances of greenfield 
banks versus M&As, and of M&As versus domestic banks. Moreover, we try to identify 
whether an age effect on performance exists with respect to M&As.  
 
The results obtained are as follow. First, we confirm that foreign banks outperform their 
domestic peers, a common finding in the literature on emerging and transition economies. 
Second, we find that on average, M&As are surpassed in terms of efficiency by 
greenfields banks, but no cost efficiency difference is apparent between M&As and 
                                                 
2 We define foreign banks as those in which foreign owners (Companies + Individuals) hold at least 50% of 
total share capital. A greenfield investment involves the establishment of an institution from scratch, 
whereas a merger and acquisition implies the purchase of a firm's (here a bank's) shares or other form of 
capital. In this paper, we are exclusively interested in a control acquisition, i.e. the purchase of equal to or 
more than 50% of a bank's capital.   3
domestic banks. Moreover, we find a strong age effect with respect to M&As which 
suggests that the evolution of M&As’ efficiency follows an inverse U-shape, that means 
M&As tend to get more inefficient following the acquisition, but approximately 4 years 
and a haft later, their efficiency starts to improve. 
 
Our paper is most closely related to the empirical literature on the role of foreign 
ownership on bank performance. A large number of studies have attempted to answer this 
question for both developed and developing economies. The results obtained point to a 
sharp contrast between mature and emerging markets. For instance, in an empirical study 
of developed economies, Berger et al. (2000) find that foreign banks are less efficient 
than domestic banks in terms of cost and profit efficiency. However, some banking 
organizations, particularly from the United States, are found to consistently operate at or 
above the efficiency levels of domestic banks. In contrast, empirical evidence on 
developing economies point out that foreign banks are more efficient than domestic 
banks. The contrasting results may reflect differences in initial conditions, particularly in 
the levels of economic and financial developments (Lensink & Hermes, 2004; Hermes & 
Lensink, 2004). This may also be explained by significant differences in the reasons for 
entry as well as in the competitive and regulatory conditions between mature and 
emerging economies (Claessens et al., 2001), (Mathieson & Roldos, 2001)
3. 
 
The line of literature that addresses the impact of foreign bank entry on bank performance 
in the context of transition economies has done so mainly by comparing the performances 
of foreign and domestic banks. Common findings generally point to a positive 
relationship between foreign involvement, foreign ownership, as denoted by different 
levels of participation of foreign banks in domestic banks, and bank performance (Bonin 
et al., 2005). 
 
There are some studies that have focused on the countries of interest to our paper. For 
instance, Sabi (1996) compares the performance of domestic and foreign banks in 
Hungary for the period 1992-1993. At this time, the foreign banks present in Hungary are 
mostly greenfield investments. The author constructs accounting measures of bank 
performance that reflect profitability, liquidity and credit risk, and commitment to the 
market economy of both types of banks. He then uses the t- test and Kruskal–Wallis test, 
and finds that there are significant differences in these indicators generally in favor of 
foreign banks. 
 
Weill (2003) studies bank efficiency in the Czech Republic and Poland in 1997. He 
estimates cost efficiency scores using Stochastic Frontier Analysis. The results show that, 
on average, foreign banks are more cost efficient than domestic banks. In a second-stage 
regression, he confirms that this finding was not due to the smaller size of foreign banks 
nor their structure of activities. 
 
Hasan & Marton (2003) study bank efficiency in Hungary over the period from 1993 to 
1998. They compute cost and profit efficiencies using Stochastic Frontier Analysis. The 
                                                 
3 (Mathieson & Roldos, 2001, p. 37) nicely explains the differences in initial conditions between mature 
and emerging markets.   4
results suggest that domestic banks are less cost- and profit-efficient than those with 
foreign participation, which confirms those obtained by Weill (2003) for the Czech 
Republic and Poland. Moreover, they divide foreign banks into four groups based on the 
extent of foreign involvement, and find that the higher the foreign participation, so is the 
efficiency. Finally, the average inefficiency scores of all banks exhibit a significant 
improvement over the sample years both in cost and profits. 
 
Havrylchyk (2006) studies bank efficiency in Poland from 1997 to 2001. She computes 
cost, allocative, technical, pure technical, and scale efficiency scores for foreign and 
domestic banks using Data Envelopment Analysis. The results show that foreign banks 
are significantly more cost-efficient than domestic banks, confirming the findings of 
Weill (2003). Nevertheless, over the period studied, the efficiency of both foreign and 
domestic banks appear to have deteriorated on average, which are in contrast with the 
findings of Hasan & Marton (2003) for the case of Hungary. 
 
This literature suffers from a main drawback. Indeed, although taking into account 
various discriminating criteria amongst foreign banks such as levels of foreign 
involvement in bank ownership, types of foreign owners (strategic partners, institutional 
investors…) or countries of origin of foreign banks, few studies have taken into account 
their modes of entry. A likely reason for this deficit is the difficulty in tracking evolution 
in bank ownership over time.  
 
Recent studies (Haas & Lelyveld (2006) and Claeys & Hainz (2006)) have attempted to 
bridge this gap but have not focused on bank efficiency per se. Indeed, (Claeys & Hainz, 
2006) investigates the impact of entry modes of foreign banks on the degree of 
competition in the local banking markets, and consequently on banks’ lending rates. It 
shows that competition is stronger when market entry occurs through greenfield 
investments, which will cut down domestic banks’ interest rates. (Haas & Lelyveld, 
2006) studies credit behavior of foreign and domestic banks in Central and Eastern 
Europe from 1993-2000, and finds that during crisis periods, domestic banks contracted 
their credit base, whereas greenfield banks did not. Moreover, the credit behavior of 
greenfield institutions depends on their home countries' economic growth and the health 
of their parent banks. Thus, the focus of these studies is not on bank performance.  
 
(Majnoni et al., 2003) is one of the first studies that take into account the implications of 
foreign banks' modes of entry on bank performance in the context of Hungary from 1995 
to 2000. Using accounting measures of banks' costs and profits, they find that in terms of 
operating, employment costs as well as profitability, Greenfields outperform M&As. 
(Havrylchyk, 2006) studies the efficiency of the Polish banking industry, and also 
compares the performance of Greenfields, M&As, and domestic banks between 1997 and 
2001. Her results are consistent with (Majnoni et al., 2003)'s, that is Greenfields 
outperform both M&As and domestic banks. (Havrylchyk & Jurzyk, 2006) considers the 
profitability of foreign banks in ten Central and Eastern European countries from 1995 to 
2003. They also take into account the two modes of entry of foreign banks, and find that 
greenfield institutions are more efficient than domestic banks. However, this is not the 
case of takeover banks.    5
 
Although taking into account the comparative performances of banks entering the host 
countries by different modes, this question is not the unique focus of the papers cited 
above. We contribute to this literature by focusing on the differential implications of 
entry modes of foreign banks on their performance. Moreover, we try to indentify factors 
that may affect the performances of M&As after their privatization, with an emphasis on 
the age effect. In terms of methodology, we approach the issue through a one-stage 
approach to estimation that jointly models the cost frontier and the determinants of 
inefficiency. This one-stage approach gets round the recurrent criticisms inherent in the 
two-stage estimation approach commonly adopted so far.  
 
Our paper is also closely related to the empirical literature on the effects of cross-border 
bank mergers and acquisitions on bank performance. This literature is considerable but 
focuses mainly on the United States and to a lesser extent on developed countries in 
Europe. A larger part of these studies found no beneficial effects of M&A on target 
bank's performance. Only a few studies show positive changes in performance after a 
deal, for instance, Cornett and Tehranian (1992) find an increase in the post-acquisition 
Return on Equity and operating cash flow. Studies on emerging and transition countries 
are handful, and results are ambiguous. Indeed, Correa (2007) studies changes in 
performance for target banks by focusing on the first two years after a cross-border 
acquisition, and find that acquired banks perform worse, or at the same level of the 
country-specific indices after a takeover. Findings by Bonin et al. (2005a) indicate that 
privatized banks have succeeded in improving their efficiency, especially those privatized 
early and those with a strategic foreign investor. Havrylchyk (2004) found increased 
profitability in the case of mergers, but when it turned to acquisitions, the acquired banks 
have not only not improved their efficiency, but have even experienced deteriorating 
performance.We contribute to this literature by carrying out a comparative analysis of 
performance between M&As and domestic banks. 
 
Our work also relates to the theoretical literature on international M&As which, in 
contrast to the traditional trade literature, emphasizes that FDI through greenfield 
investments and through cross-border acquisitions are not ”perfect substitutes” as entry 
modes [e.g. Blonigen (1997), Mattoo, Olerreaga and Saggi (2004), Nocke and Yeaple 
(2006a,b) and Norbäck and Persson (2006)]. The new theory shows that systematic 
differences in affiliate performance can emerge between entry modes due to synergies 
and market power effects from acquisitions (Bertrand et al., 2007). By finding significant 
differences in the performance of Greenfield investments and M&As, we provide some 
evidence for this hypothesis. 
 
This paper is of some links to the empirical literature pertaining to foreign direct 
investment, which has so far mainly focused on determinants of entry mode. Very few 
papers have directly examined the performance of affiliates given the entry mode
4, which 
we did. 
                                                 
4 See the business literature, e.g. Shaver (1998) who analyzes the exit behavior of acquired and greenfield 
affiliates; Woodcock et al. (1994) and Slangen and Hennart (2005) who compare the overall performance 
of affiliates (See Bertrand et al., 2007, ref. cited therein).   6
 
Our paper is organized as follows. The following section provides an account of 
strategies of foreign banks in emerging and transition economies. Section 3 discusses the 
research hypotheses tested in this paper. Section 4 presents the estimation methodology 
and a description of the data is provided in section 5. Section 6 presents and discusses the 
results. A concluding section follows. 
2. Strategies of Foreign Banks: Motives, Modes of Entry, and 
Activities 
2.1 The General Case 
Motives for Entry 
 
Traditional theories of multinational banking have pointed out a number of factors that 
could explain the motivations for the entry of a bank into a foreign market. Two main 
factors are the follow-the-client behavior and the search for profitable opportunities in the 
host country. Indeed, a number of foreign banks are believed to enter emerging markets 
to serve multinational firms that are headquartered in the banks' home market. These 
foreign banks are of two types. First are those who limit their activities to services of 
their multinational clients, and offer little or no service to other multinational 
corporations or local customers in the country. They have therefore little effect on the 
domestic economy. Examples are Japanese and Korean banks that have usually entered 
emerging markets on the heels of a home-based customer they serve. Second are those 
such as ABN AMRO and Deutsche Bank who have entered emerging markets to follow 
major multinational corporations with which they have global relationships, and then 
extend their services to other multinationals, and large domestic corporations 
(Pomerleano & Vojta, 2001).  
 
Other foreign banks, who may face a mature or an intensely competitive domestic 
banking and financial services sector, have chosen to expand abroad to look for growth 
and profit opportunities. They may choose to go to two types of foreign markets: those of 
large size and with comparatively high rates of growth (the foreign market size and 
foreign market relative growth hypotheses), and those which are not intensely 
competitive and of low entry barriers irrespective of market size or relative growth (the 
foreign market competitiveness hypothesis). Citibank and HSBC are banks in this 
category. Risk management, regulation, exchange rate movements, cultural connections, 
and distance from the home market are also miscellaneous factors that motive the entry of 
foreign banks (Curry et al., 2003). 
 
The main weakness of the above framework is that it has little to say about the motives of 
those banks that enter a foreign market by acquiring domestic institutions. Another 
framework by Tschoegl (2003) offers more complete explanations on the motives of 
foreign banks. Indeed, the author classifies these into two categories: the traditionals and 
the innovators. "The traditionals consist of those many foreign banks, especially those 
operating via a branch or a small, wholly-owned subsidiary in a national financial center,   7
that are essentially engaging in normal international banking", that is, servicing trade and 
multinational firms and usually big local corporations. These banks do not seek to engage 
in retail banking.   
 
The innovators are those who come to emerging markets in response to the new 
opportunities created by deregulation, transition, and crisis. Usually, they become part of 
the solutions needed by these economies in trouble. They can be divided into three sub-
categories. The bettors are those whose implications are essentially financial, through 
portfolio investments into institutions which they thought are promising in order to wrap 
up the bulk of the value to themselves. Their investments often don't attain the controlling 
threshold. They do not therefore actually manage the banks in which they invest, but 
cooperate with a strategic partner. Examples are the International Finance Corporation or 
the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. The prospectors and the 
restructurers are those who sense a possible opportunity in the unsettled situation 
following opening, crisis or deregulation. They therefore invest in these markets by 
establishing small subsidiaries or joint ventures, or taking large equity positions in local 
banks. Nonetheless, the prospectors' engagement is exploratory rather than part of a 
broader strategy as in the case of the restructurers. In case of bad profitability outlook, 
they will walk away. One example is the case of Allied Irish Banks in Poland and 
Singapore. The investments of the restructurers, in contrast, are not a trial but rather a 
large scale commitment. Examples of banks in this category abound as banks such as 
Unicredito (Italy), Erste Bank (Austria), KBC (Belgium), Société Générale (France), and 
others have acquired banks throughout the transition economies.  
 
Several factors may motivate the choice of an entry strategy by acquiring a domestic 
institution. Indeed, a foreign bank may choose to acquire a domestic bank that performs 
poorly because poor performers provide a relatively low-cost entry vehicle. New 
management would then attempt to improve the long-run performance of the bank by 
upgrading standards or through changes in business strategies. Alternatively, the target 
bank may provide a mechanism to exploit expertise and/or cost advantages of the new 
foreign owner, whether or not the target bank has been a poor performer. Another factor 
is the strategic orientation of servicing in the retail market because engaging in retail 
activities requires a significant branch network, which is too costly to set up from scratch 
than compared to acquiring a local bank which already has such network.  
Modes of Entry 
 
There is some confusion in the literature with respect to the categorization of modes of 
entry. We should distinguish between the institutional forms of entry represented by 
different organizational structures such as representative offices, branches, affiliates, and 
subsidiaries, and the modes of entry by foreign banks, i.e. greenfield investment versus 
merger or acquisition of an incumbent bank. 
 
Forms of Entry. A branch is not an independent legal entity, but an integral part of the 
parent. It may provide a full range of banking services and operates on the basis of the 
parent's full capital base. In contrast, an affiliate is an independent legal entity in which   8
the foreign bank has less than majority ownership. A subsidiary, like an affiliate, is a 
separate legal entity incorporated in the host country, but one in which the foreign parent 
has majority ownership. 
 
Each of the above organizational forms has its own advantages and disadvantages. A 
branch is less costly to establish than a subsidiary, because there is no costs of 
incorporation, no need to report annually to local registrar of companies, no need for a 
board of directors, and so forth. It is more appropriate for conducting wholesale and 
corporate banking activities in host countries, including foreign exchange and money 
market trading. Nevertheless, as it is part of the parent bank, a branch requires careful 
supervision because unauthorized trading could make the parent bankrupt. A subsidiary, 
in contrast, may fail even though the parent is solvent and vice versa, because it is an 
independent entity. However, a major constraint for a subsidiary is that it can only make 
loans on the basis of its own capitalization. Thus, it is hardly appropriate for conducting 
corporate lending and trading activities. In the case of an affiliate, the foreign bank 
doesn't have full control over it, so its role is limited to that of a prospector rather than of 
a long term commitment. 
 
Representative office is the least constrained and least costly form of organization. It is 
like an embassy or a consulate of a company in a foreign market. However, it cannot 
conduct any type of business. Therefore, it is suitable with an aim of exploring business 
opportunities in a foreign country. 
 
Modes of Entry. A greenfield investment involves the establishment of an institution from 
scratch, whereas a merger and acquisition implies the purchase of a firm's (here a bank's) 
shares or other form of capital. In this paper, we are exclusively interested in a Control 
Acquisition, i.e. the purchase of equal to or more than 50% of a bank's capital.  
 
Entering via a greenfield investment allows the foreign bank to take advantage of its 
international reputation, particularly in less developed or less stable economies where 
depositors may feel more secure banking with well known foreign banks. It also allows 
foreign banks to target market segments, which would not be possible with the 
acquisition of a local entity, because it would leave the foreign bank with customer 
profiles of the old domestic bank which are incompatible or at least inconsistent with the 
overall market positioning of the parent bank and of which it is costly to make 
adjustment. However, entering via Merger and Acquisition of a local bank also has its 
own advantage. Indeed, it gives the foreign bank access to local knowledge. Moreover, 
where the strategy calls for a comprehensive retail network, acquisition may be the more 
feasible alternative, particularly if moving quickly is important.  In addition, it also hands 
the foreign bank with immediate access to core deposits, which allows them to engage in 
local lending more rapidly. Finally, foreign acquisition may be advantageous for 
multinational banks about which little is known in potential host markets. 
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Areas of Activities 
 
Foreign banks are better positioned to deliver products and services that require a global 
platform, a considerable amount of capital, have a strong technological content, and 
demand sophisticated skills and experience. Domestic banks have greater strengths in 
delivering products and services that require local capabilities, i.e. local knowledge, 
access to local currency, possession of a local branch network… Foreign-acquired banks 
are better able to capture these capabilities compared to their greenfield counterparts. 
 
As a result, foreign banks tend to focus on corporate banking while domestic banks are 
more inclined to service the local retail and SME markets. Corporate banking products 
offered by foreign banks range from trade finance, project finance, syndicated loans, 
foreign exchange services, risk management products, cash management services to 
financial advisory services, while domestic banks' presence is more pervasive for the 
delivery of working capital and term loans (Pomerleano & Vojta, 2001).. 
 
2.2 The Case of Central and Eastern European Countries, in Particular the 
Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland 
Motives for Entry 
 
As in the general case, follow-the-client behavior and the drive towards new business 
opportunities remain two most important reasons behind the entry of foreign banks into 
CEE countries. Examples are the expansion of banks from Austria, Germany, US, and the 
Netherlands. Austrian and German banks were among the first to enter CEE countries, 
and currently are represented in the largest numbers. In Hungary, Austrian banks tend to 
acquire low-risk customers with large volume transactions such as multinationals and 
Hungarian monopolies (Majnoni et al., 2003). Citibank, ING, and ABN AMRO first 
follow their clients into these countries, then after the setting-up phase, they tend to 
develop their services using a local customer base and compete directly with domestic 
banks (Konopielko, 1999).  
 
Another motive was simply to secure presence in view of possible future expansion. This 
"wait-and-see" approach is followed, for instance, by Deutsche Bank in Hungary 
(Majnoni et al., 2003). 
 
We also note that some reasons specific to CEE countries may explain the entry of M&A 
banks. For instance, in Poland, a number of foreign banks may have accepted to take over 
certain Polish banks in trouble simply to "buy" a license to operate in this market. They 
were not really interested in these banks, and therefore did not effectively engage in their 
restructuring and management. As an example, in December 1994, Westdeutsche 
Landesbank agreed to buy 29% of the new issue of shares in Bank Morski in exchange 
for a license granted by the National Bank of Poland in February 1995. A similar 
procedure was subsequently applied to other German banks as in return for a license, they 
were forced either to support banks in trouble or to take over the `remainder’ of almost  10
bankrupt Polish banks (Konopielko, 1999). Nevertheless, in some cases, the reasons for 
entry of M&As may not be clear, as (Abarbanell & Bonin, 1997, p. 48) noted for the case 
of ING acquiring Bank Slaski in Poland "Whether ING’s decision to take a majority stake 
in the bank was motivated by a desire to exercise tighter control over policy and strategy 
is not known…”. 
Modes of Entry 
 
All of the two modes of entry discussed above, i.e. Greenfield investment versus Merger 
and Acquisition, are so far present in CEE markets. Their introduction follows two 
separate waves. Indeed, the transformation of the mono-bank system into a two-tier one 
has led to the first wave of entry by greenfield banks. Then, the privatization process in 
these countries has created the opportunities for foreign banks to acquire domestic banks. 
This is the second wave of entry by M&A banks. 
 
With respect to the forms of entry, according to Konopielko (1999), the most appealing 
vehicle of entry is through setting up a subsidiary, either from scratch or through the 
acquisition of existing banks. However, in the specific case of the Czech Republic, the 
prevalent strategy is entry by setting up a branch, which mirrors the Czech Republic's 
very liberal strategy towards foreign branches. Indeed, as soon as 1992, the Act on Banks 
already opened the door to foreign branches by permitting assessments of foreign branch 
license applications on less restrictive terms than the assessment of full banking license 
applications by Czech nationals (Simonson, 2001). 
 
Affiliates come up when medium-term portfolio investors acquire a minority of shares in 
banks, which will be sold later. And in order to follow the "wait-and-see" approach, a 
number of investment banks as well as some specialized banks adopt the representative 
office form of organization. However, as Konopielko (1999) reports: 
  "…there are a number of exceptions to these rules, mostly prompted by risk 
perception or regulatory barriers. For example, a number of foreign banks kept 
their representative offices in Poland throughout the period of license moratorium 
…. and later established subsidiaries based on these offices when it became 
legally possible. Investment in minority shares might on the other hand be caused 
by a strategy of gradual increase of commitment in case of good financial results". 
Areas of Activities 
 
As in the general case of emerging countries, the most important areas of activity of 
foreign banks in CEE are corporate banking and trade services (foreign exchange trading, 
and trade finance). Interbank operations weigh also heavily in their balance sheet, both on 
the asset and liabilities sides.  
 
Retail activities are perceived as being the least important. This means entering banks do 
not adopt a retail strategy in these markets. The main reasons may be the low level of 
individual wealth as well as high set-up costs. However, since the second half of the 
1990s, some foreign banks started to realize the potential of the retail market, and began  11
to actively participate in this market. As an example, some foreign greenfield banks in 
Hungary and Poland offer car financing and lending for investing in mutual funds. As 
Bonin & Abel (2000) noted, throughout the 1990s, foreign banks in Hungary have 
steadily increased their market share in household deposits from 1.1% in 1993 to 41.5% 
in 1999, and in household credits from 0.7% in 1993 to 34.8% in 1999. 
 
Other activities which complement core corporate services are non-financial services 
such as consulting, security trading and leasing. These allow banks to use their know-
how and liquid resources to earn some extra income. However, as there are a number of 
specialized non-bank institutions in these areas of activity, they are treated as `windows 
of opportunity’ rather than directions in which banks should concentrate their resources 
and efforts (Konopielko, 1999). 
 
In the Czech Republic, in terms of asset structure, the shares of credits and of tradable 
securities in foreign banks' balance sheet are generally lower than in large domestic 
banks. On the liabilities side, foreign banks depend heavily on interbank markets, having 
a much lower level of clients’ deposits in their portfolios. This underlines the corporate-
oriented approach of foreign banks. 
 
In Poland, foreign banks engage around 40% of their assets in interbank operations and 
trade finance. However, most of the foreign banks also depend heavily on the interbank 
market. Deposits in financial institutions averaged 10.6% of assets, while for 100% 
owned foreign banks the corresponding ratio amounted to 32.8%. Most of the foreign 
banks have already established or are due to establish their own brokerage firms. Another 
notable distinction of foreign banks is their low level of fixed assets in total asset volume. 
This is caused by the low number of branches of these banks outside Warsaw. In most 
cases, banks’ premises are rented and therefore contribute to operating costs. Some banks 
(Creditanstalt, ING and LG Petrobank) recently engaged in the development of 
headquarters buildings which in future might lead to an increase of fixed assets/total 
assets ratio and a decrease in operating costs (Konopielko, 1999). 
3. Research Hypotheses 
 
So far, most of the literature on the role of foreign ownership on bank performance has 
arrived at the following main conclusion: foreign banks outperform their domestic peers. 
Based on this result, we formulate the following hypothesis 1. 
 
Hypothesis 1: Comparative Performance of Foreign Banks versus Domestic Banks 
Foreign banks are more efficient than domestic banks. 
 
Two institutional modes of entry have corresponded to the two waves of foreign bank 
entry as described in section 2. Findings by (Majnoni et al., 2003), (Havrylchyk, 2006), 
and (Havrylchyk & Jurzyk, 2006) indicate a superior performance of Greenfields over 
M&As. Consequently, we formulate the following hypothesis 2. 
 
  12
Hypothesis 2: Comparative Performance of Greenfields versus M&As  
Greenfields outperform M&As.  
 
From hypotheses 1 & 2, we can assume that greenfields banks are more efficient than 
their domestic counterparts. What interests us here is the comparative performance 
between M&As and domestic banks. This comparison is of bigger interest to us because 
of the following reasons. First, transition countries had, for a long time, hesitated to 
completely liberalize the entry of M&As, that is they had been very reluctant to sell a 
majority part of their banks to foreigners because of fears of foreign dominance of the 
banking sector. Once they did, their primary objective is to help improve the efficiency of 
these banks, which otherwise could difficultly be achieved. Therefore, the comparison 
would help shed light on whether this objective is attained or not. Moreover, the scope of 
activities of M&As and domestic banks being similar, their comparison would be more 
correct. 
 
Findings by the literature on the effect of cross-border bank mergers and acquisitions on 
bank performance (cf. the introduction section) show ambiguous results. Therefore, we 
formulate the following hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Comparative Performance of M&As versus Domestic Banks 
M&As may or may not outperform their domestic peers.  
 
Which factors may affect the performance of M&As after their privatization? As our 
study is carried out on the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland, we discuss here factors 
relevant for these countries.  
 
The first factor may be the corporate governance of the bank after the privatization which 
is determined by its ownership structure, which, in turn, results from the method of 
transfer of ownership during the privatization process. The literature so far seems to agree 
on the importance of attracting a strategic foreign investor on condition that it takes an 
active role in the development of bank strategy, and brings about new technology and its 
expertise to the bank. It appears to emerge from the literature that the presence of a 
strategic investor is not a panacea. Indeed, as far as its investment does not reach a 
controlling threshold, the presence of two large shareholders - the government and the 
strategic investor, none with a majority part giving it the control of the bank (a common 
pattern in the early privatization period) - may not help improving the bank’s 
performance, since conflicts of interest between the shareholders may adversely affect the 
development of the bank’s strategy and will give the bank management the effective 
influence on the bank
5. On the other hand, pure Initial Public Offerings and voucher 
programs, which leads to diffuse ownership, is also of little benefits because it may also 
leave incumbent managers with a stronger hold on the bank than its shareholder. 
However, since our definition of foreign ownership requires that from 50% of the bank 
capital is foreign-owned, a majority of M&As in our sample don’t face these problems as 
they have a controlling strategic investor. 
 
                                                 
5 See, for example, (Abarbanell & Bonin, 1997) on the case of Bank Slaski in Poland.  13
The second factor may be the nature of the inherited problems from former state-owned 
banks faced by M&As. Indeed, there may be two major problems: an asset of uncertain 
quality with some proportion of problem loans, and an overly large staff with a non 
negligible fraction of those with outdated skills (Abarbanell & Bonin, 1997). The 
inherited problems could also stem from the bad legacy represented by counter-
commercial attitudes left over from the communist era, high operating costs and above-
average reserves, inefficient branch network, underdeveloped IT, and low quality 
clientele… (Majnoni et al., 2003, p. 14). It takes time for M&As to resolve the asset 
quality problem by restructuring bad loans and introducing new lending practices and 
procedures. In some cases, these domestic banks acquired have had long term 
relationships with traditional financially troubled industries, or the merger and acquisition 
operations may have been facilitated by local authorities on condition that the new 
M&As maintain a certain level of financial support to these unattractive sectors. 
Therefore, it also takes time to reorient the loan portfolio away from these sectors into 
healthier industries, especially in the presence of local pressure. It takes time, too, to 
reduce the workforce because of fear of labor action or of confrontation with the political 
bodies which have themselves employment objectives (Abarbanell & Bonin, 1997). We 
call this adjustment process the age effect. Thus, the time it takes to get rid of the 
inherited problems (measured by the age of the bank) serves to measure the extent of 
these problems. 
 
The third factor may be the ongoing government intervention which could have a 
detrimental effect on the performance of privatized banks. Indeed, direct or indirect 
financial support to poorly performing banks may create moral hazard problems. The use 
of banks for policy goals such as channeling credits based on non-market criteria delays 
the transformation of the banks into effective financial intermediaries (Meyendorff & 
Snyder, 1997). Nevertheless, as our definition of foreign banks fixes the threshold to be 
considered foreign at 50% of the bank capital, this is less likely to happen with M&As in 
our sample. Anyway, this factor is difficult to document and quantify. 
 
We may expect factors affecting the performance of M&As after privatization may also 
contribute to explaining discrepancies in performance between M&As and other banks.  
 
With respect to the comparison with greenfield banks, differences in the nature of 
activities may be another explanatory factor. Indeed, it is widely believed that the 
portfolio of greenfield banks is more selective than those of other banks, which could be 
conducive to their better performance. They choose mostly lower-risk activities, and 
serve mainly lower-risk customers. This is not the case of M&As as their portfolios 
reflect, at least in the early years after privatization, those of the former state-owned 
banks. 
 
Bank size may also play a role, as stylized facts often indicate that Greenfields are of 
smaller size while M&As may suffer from diseconomies of scale due to the fact that they 
acquire large institutions (Havrylchyk & Jurzyk, 2006). 
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Market share may be a factor too as M&As often evolve from former state-owned banks 
with a significant share of the market. Indeed, according to the theoretical literature on 
M&As, systematic differences in affiliate performance can emerge between entry modes 
due to synergies and market power effects from acquisitions. 
 
In contrast, technology and banking know-how would not be the discriminating factors, 
as both Greenfields and M&As are supposed to possess these skills and technologies.  
 
We also include the factors discussed above into the comparison between M&As and 
domestic banks. 
 
These arguments lead to the formulation of hypothesis 4. 
 
Hypothesis 4: Factors Affecting the Differential Performance between M&As and 
Other Banks 
The nature of the inherited problems faced by M&A bank as captured by the age effect, 
the structure of activities, bank size and market share may be the factors affecting the 
differential performance between M&As and other banks. 
4. Estimation Methodology 
4.1 Efficiency Estimation Method: Stochastic Frontier Analysis 
A number of techniques are available for the estimation of efficiency, which can be 
categorized into parametric and non-parametric ones. Weill (2003) gives a concise 
discussion on the advantages and disadvantages of each technique, and on the choice of 
an appropriate technique. Here in this paper, we choose a popular parametric technique, 
i.e. Stochastic Frontier Analysis (henceforth SFA).  
 
Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt (1977) and Meeusen and Van Den Broeck (1977) 
independently proposed the stochastic frontier production model of the form 
i i i i u v q − + = β
' ln x    i = 1, … I 
where  qi  represents the output of the i-th firm; xi  is a K x 1 vector containing the 
logarithms of inputs; β is a vector of unknown parameters; vi is a symmetric random error 
accounting for statistical noise; and ui is a non-negative random variable associated with 
technical efficiency.  
 
Explicit assumptions about the distribution of the measurement errors vi and the X-
inefficiency terms ui allow the frontiers to be estimated using the method of maximum 
likelihood. The measurement errors are typically assumed to be random errors 
independently and normally distributed with mean zero and constant variance. These are 
therefore often referred to as the “two-sided” error terms as they are symmetrically 
distributed around the “true” frontier. By contrast the inefficiency terms are assumed to 
have an independent distribution which is truncated below by the frontier itself. For this 
reason, these inefficiency terms are often referred to as the “one-sided” error terms. A  15
number of distributions have been suggested for them: half normal, truncated normal, 
exponential, and gamma. 
4.2 Accounting for Environmental Variables 
The ability of managers to convert inputs into outputs is often influenced by exogenous 
variables that characterize the environment in which production takes place. The question 
then is how to account for these environmental factors? 
 
There are three competing approaches regarding the way the issue of environment is 
addressed.  
 
Environmental factors in the production frontier 
 
The first approach assumes that the environmental factors influence the shape of the 
technology. Therefore, these factors should be included directly into the non-stochastic 
component of the production frontier (e.g., Good et al. (1993)). This leads to a model of 
the form 
    i i i i i u v q − + + = γ β
' ' ln z x  
where zi is a vector of (transformations of) environmental variables and γ is a vector of 
unknown parameters. In this case, it is assumed that each firm faces a different 
production frontier. 
 
Environmental factors in the inefficiency term 
 
The second approach assumes the environmental factors influence the degree of technical 
inefficiency (and not the shape of technology) and hence that these factors should be 
modeled so that they directly influence the inefficiency term
6. The underlying hypotheses 
is that all firms share the same technology represented by the production frontier and that 
the environmental factors have an influence only on the distance that separates each firm 
from the best practice function. 
 
Early empirical papers (e.g. Pitt and Lee, 1981 and Kalijaran, 1981) explore the 
relationship between environmental variables and predicted technical efficiencies using a 
two-stage approach. In the first stage, the firm-specific inefficiency effects assumed to be 
identically distributed are retrieved from the estimated stochastic frontier. In the second 
stage, the predicted inefficiencies are used as a dependent variable in a regression model 
in which explanatory exogenous variables seek to explain differences in these effects 
(e.g. Mester, 1993). This approach is subject to two main weaknesses. One is that, in the 
first stage, when the production or cost relationship is estimated, the efficiency terms are 
assumed to be independently and identically distributed, but in the second stage they are 
assumed to be a function of these firm-specific factors, implying that they are not 
identically distributed
7. The other problem is that failure to include environmental 
                                                 
6 For a comparison of these two approaches, see Coelli et al. (1999). 
7 Unless all the coefficients of the factors are simultaneously equal to zero.  16
variables in the first stage leads to biased estimators of the parameters of the deterministic 
part of the production frontier, and also to biased predictors of technical efficiency
8.  
 
These criticisms have given rise to a substantial empirical literature on the modeling of 
the inefficiency effects, leading to the emergence of a one-stage approach, whereby these 
inefficiency effects are modeled jointly with the frontier
9.  
 
One approach to estimating the effect of systematic influences on X-inefficiency is to 
assume that the truncation point of the one-sided distribution shifts depending on the 
exogenous factors assumed to determine efficiency. This leads to a model of the form: 
i i i i u v q − + = β
' ln x  
where   ) , ( ~
2 '
u i i N u δ γ z
+ , zi is a vector of systematic influences on mean efficiency. This 
is known as the conditional mean approach ( (Kumbhakar, Ghosh, & McGuckin, 1991), 
(Huang and Liu, 1994), (Battese and Coelli, 1995)). In this type of model, the two-sided 
error is typically assumed to be 
2 (0, ) v N σ . The main weakness of this model is that it 
doesn’t take into account the possibility of heteroskedasticity in the variances of both 
types of error. 
 
In a second approach, (Caudill & Ford, 1993), (Caudill, Ford, & Gropper, 1995), and 
(Hadri, 1999) seek to address the problem of heteroscedasticity by parameterizing the 
variance of the inefficiency term. That is, δui is assumed to be  ) , ( γ δ i i u g z = . However, 
this model cannot incorporate the features of the conditional mean model by assuming 
the truncation point of the one-sided distribution to be constant. 
  
In a third approach, (Wang, 2002, 2003) combine the two models above by 
parameterizing both the mean and the variance of the inefficiency term. That means, ui is 
assumed to be  ) , ( ~
2
i u i i N u δ µ
+ , where  γ µ
'
i i z =  and  ) exp(
' 2 γ δ i ui z = . This model affords 
the non-monotonic efficiency effect as discussed in details in (Wang, 2002). However, as 
a result, it restricts the functional form of the variance of the inefficiency term to be 
exponential.  
 
Environmental factors in both 
Some researchers incorporate the environmental factors both in the production frontier 
and the inefficiency term
10. Note that no theoretical argument has been used to justify 
these approaches. Their use is rather justified in the statistical ground. 
 
                                                 
8 For more details, see Caudill, Ford, and Gropper (1995), and Wang & Schmidt (2002). 
9 Contributions to the development of the one-stage approach include Khumbhakar, Ghosh and McGuckin 
(1991); Reichsneider and Stevenson (1991); Yuengert (1993); Simar, Lovell and Vanden Eeckaut (1994); 
Huang and Liu (1994); Caudill, Ford and Gropper (1995) and Battese and Coelli (1995), Wang and 
Schmidt (2002) and Wang (2003) amongst others. For a discussion and review of this literature, see 
Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000), Ch 7. 
10  See e.g. Fries et al. (2005).  17
4.3 The Cost Efficiency Model 
The measure of bank efficiency we focus on in this paper is cost efficiency, i.e. the 
distance of the firm relative to the best practice frontier. It denotes the quality of the bank 
management. 
 
As far as the modeling of the inefficiency term is concerned, our preferred framework is 
the conditional mean model. However, bearing in mind the weaknesses of each approach 
as presented above, we also estimate the heteroskedasticity model in a check of 
robustness. 
 
Functional form 
 
The analysis of efficiency in the services industry using SFA has led researchers to 
estimate a wide range of functional forms for the associated frontiers
11. Generally, the 
more parameters in the estimated function, the more flexible it is, such that it is possible 
to estimate a frontier which is as close as possible to the “true” (non-parametric) frontier. 
The translog function is generally considered a flexible functional form and has been 
used extensively in the literature on banking efficiency. In this study, we use the same 
specification, given as: 
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where C represents total costs, y represents the outputs of the bank and the p variables are 
the prices of the inputs. Total costs and input prices are normalized with respect to p3 
(price of one of the inputs) to ensure linear homogeneity. The equity variable is included 
in the cost function to control for risk preferences. All the variables are in natural 
logarithm. Although we choose three relatively homogenous countries for our study, 
structural conditions in banking and general macroeconomic conditions may still generate 
differences in bank efficiency from country to country. We therefore include both 
country and time effects in the estimation of the frontier to control for these factors. For 
the sake of simplicity, we do not include the index for bank in the equation. 
 
ε is the composed error equal to the sum of the measurement error (v) and the X-
inefficiency term (u). Because the inefficiency term is expected to increase costs, the sign 
on u is positive. Consistent maximum likelihood estimation of the above function for 
each bank will reveal both the structure of the cost function and the firm-specific X-
inefficiency effects. Our definition of inputs and outputs follows the intermediation 
approach, whereby banks are seen as accepting deposits from customers and transforming 
                                                 
11 These include Cobb-Douglas, Box-Cox, quadratic, the composite function, translog and the flexible 
Fourier form.  18
these into loans to clients and other investments. We therefore include two outputs in the 
cost function: y1=loans and y2=investment assets
12. We would have liked to take into 
account off-balance-sheet items as a third output. However, due to a large number of 
missing observations of this item (almost one third of the total number of observations), 
we are unable to do so. We use the prices of labor, physical capital and borrowed funds 
as the inputs in the estimation of the cost function. The price of borrowed funds is used to 
normalize each variable to ensure linear homogeneity. Following the literature, the price 
of labor is the ratio of personnel expenses to total assets, given the unavailability of data 
on the number of employees. The price of physical capital is constructed as the ratio of 
other non-interest expenses to fixed assets and the price of borrowed funds is the ratio of 
interest paid to all funding. Total costs are the sum of personnel expenses, interest paid 
and other non-interest expenses.  
 
In terms of the modeling of the inefficiency term, the inclusion of variables capturing 
exogenous factors will help to identify whether discrepancies in performance through 
each type of bank could be influenced by these factors as opposed to simply better 
management. We construct three binary dummy variables in the data: foreign, merger and 
greenfield. These represent, respectively, whether the bank is foreign-owned or domestic-
owned, whether it has merged with or acquired a domestic bank or not and whether it has 
entered through greenfield investment or not. Along with these dummy variables, our 
inefficiency model controls for the impact of the following factors on bank inefficiency. 
 
Size. To account for bank size, we use the natural log of total assets. 
 
Structure of activities. To account for the nature of activities of banks, we construct two 
variables. To reflect differences in the structure of assets, we take into account the ratios 
of investment assets over loans. On the liabilities side, we include the share of deposits in 
total funding in the regressions. 
 
Age effect. We capture the adjustment process of M&As over time with an age variable. 
We also take into account the square of the age or the natural logarithm of the age to 
allow for the possibility that the way cost efficiency adjusts over time may be following a 
non-linear path. 
  
We calculate the age of a bank by the number of full years since its incorporation. In case 
a domestic bank is acquired and becomes majority foreign-owned, we classify the former 
bank as domestic until the acquisition date, and the new merged bank as foreign from the 
first full year following the acquisition date. The date of incorporation for the new 
merged bank is therefore this first full year. For those domestic banks whose dates of 
incorporation are before the transition, we take the date of creation of the two-tier 
banking system which marked the beginning of a commercial banking system as that of 
incorporation as only from this date that these banks started to operate on a commercial 
basis. 
 
                                                 
12 This item is denoted as "other earning assets" in BankScope, which are all the earning assets other than 
loans.  19
Market share. We calculate a bank’s market share as its share of assets over total banking 
sector's assets.  
5. Data  
 
We obtained data from Bureau van Dijk's BankScope database, version 2006. For our 
sample, we select three most advanced countries in Central Europe: the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, and Poland. We choose these countries for a number of reasons. Indeed, we are 
first motivated by their very high levels of foreign bank penetration in comparison with 
other transition countries, and even with other developing countries. Consequently, 
greenfield and merger and acquisition entries take place most extensively in these 
countries. This therefore facilitates the analysis of different modes of entry on banks’ cost 
performance. Second, the activities of foreign banks there are better documented than in 
other transition economies. Finally, the levels of economic development between the 
three countries are relatively homogeneous, which facilitates the cross-country 
comparison. 
 
As it is commonly known by academic researchers and professionals, the data for banks 
from less developed and transition countries require substantial editing before a reliable 
sample can be constructed. We therefore carefully review our data to avoid double 
counting of institutions, to exclude non-bank financial institutions from the sample. We 
also exclude banks that are not commercial, cooperative and savings banks to ensure that 
we are estimating performance based on a relatively homogeneous group of banks. With 
respect to the type of account, we prefer unconsolidated accounts to consolidated ones 
wherever available. Once the type of account chosen, we take the one following the 
international financial reporting standards (IFRS) wherever available. If not, we take the 
account with local accounting standards. Nevertheless, sometimes IFRS data are 
available for only one or two years while longer time series are available in local 
standards. In such cases we use local standards. Thus, our final sample consists of 153 
banks from the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland over the period 1994 to 2004. The 
distribution of banks by ownership and mode of entry is given in table 2. 
 
While BankScope has a very large coverage of banks over the world, this database 
provides information on bank ownership only for the current calendar year. Thus, we 
have had to track the evolution in the ownership of each bank over time through several 
sources, including banks’ official publications and Zephyr (Bureau Van Dijk)
13. This 
enabled us to differentiate between foreign and domestic banks, and, among foreign 
banks, between greenfield investments and merger and acquisition entries.  
 
Table 3 displays summary statistics of the sample. We observe the existence of 
differences between the categories of banks. In terms of size, the mean M&A bank is 
approximately six times bigger than a greenfield bank and two times bigger than a 
domestic bank. In terms of the structure of activities, the volumes of investment assets 
hold by M&As and domestic banks are much higher than that of greenfield banks. In fact, 
                                                 
13 We are grateful to R.d. Haas and I.v. Lelyveld from de Nederlandsche Bank for kindly sharing data on 
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the former tend to invest massively on government securities with higher returns and 
lower risk, rather than make loans in a context of difficulties in identifying high-quality 
new clients, of the nascent stage of institutional infrastructure supporting property and 
creditors’ rights, and information asymmetries. As an example, in Poland, government 
securities comprised over 25% of Bank Slaski’s total assets at the end of 1995 
(Abarbanell & Bonin, 1997, p. 53). This feature is also confirmed by Havrylchyk (2006, 
p. 10). M&As and domestic banks also possess much higher volumes of loans than 
Greenfields. Therefore, the difference in the relative ratio of investment assets over loans 
becomes much narrower. 
6. Results  
 
We report our results by first comparing foreign banks against domestic banks to see if 
our results are in line with the existing empirical evidence. We then turn our focus to the 
comparative efficiency of Greenfields versus M&As, and of M&As versus domestic 
banks. The parameter estimates from the translog cost functions
14 by themselves have 
little informational value; they are simply means to the end of producing a frontier with 
which to estimate bank-specific cost efficiency scores. Of more interest are the 
coefficient estimates from the inefficiency models, which show the impact of the 
particular variables on bank cost inefficiency.  
6.1 Foreign Banks versus Domestic Banks 
In this section, we present results for hypothesis 1 on the comparative performance of 
foreign banks versus domestic banks. Weill (2003) includes bank size and structure of 
activities variables in his second-stage regressions of determinants of cost efficiency to 
control for the influence of exogenous factors other than managerial performance. We 
follow him here but in a one-stage setting. The results are shown in table 4(1).  
 
First, the negative and highly significant coefficient on foreign  suggests that foreign 
banks are on average more cost efficient than their domestic peers. This again confirms 
the results obtained so far in the literature on emerging and transition economies. Because 
we control for bank size and structure of assets, we conclude that the better efficiency of 
foreign banks does result from better management. 
 
The negative and highly significant coefficient on lnassets indicates that the size of the 
bank tends to increase its efficiency. This may be explained by the fact that the average 
size of banks in the three countries does not reach the critical size to achieve efficiency. 
With regards to the structure of assets, the positive and significant coefficient on shareinv 
suggests that banks with a higher proportion of investment assets over loans are more 
inefficient. The coefficient on sharedep is negative but insignificant. This suggests that 
deposits are not more or less costly than other funding as a source of bank financing.  
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We also report the efficiency scores across ownership types. Consistent with the results 
above, average efficiency scores of foreign banks surpass those of domestic banks.  
 
Our results thus differ from those obtained by Weill (2003) in that bank size and structure 
of assets do exert an impact on bank efficiency. The divergence might result from the fact 
that we have a larger sample over a much longer period. 
 
How to explain the superior performance of foreign banks over domestic banks? Apart 
from better management, size, and structure of activities as indicated by our results, 
foreign banks have a comparative advantage in banking technology and know-how 
provided by their mother companies. (Weill, 2003) conjectures that foreign-owned banks’ 
advantages may be the result of better control by private shareholders. Indeed, 
shareholders of foreign banks in transition countries are mostly from Western countries. 
Therefore, they are more used to monitoring bank managers, since they are less inclined 
to enter into friendly relationships with managers, which is a key problem in transition 
banking. For the specific case of Hungary, according to (Majnoni et al., 2003), foreign 
banks are pursuing a lending policy not dissimilar from that of domestic banks, but at the 
same time they are able to achieve a higher profitability. This can be explained by the 
fact that foreign bank success is related to a product innovation, which could be tied to 
their ability to supply a broader array of financial services than their domestic 
competitors, and to a better screening and monitoring of their loan applicants. 
6.2 Greenfield Banks versus M&As 
We run regressions for a separate sample composed solely of Greenfields and M&As. 
The regressions results are shown in table 5 (1) and (2).  
 
We first include only the mode of entry dummy, i.e. merger in the modeling of the 
inefficiency term (specification (1)). The results show a positive although not significant 
coefficient on merger, which might be an indication that M&As are less efficient than 
Greenfields.  
 
Therefore, in a next step, we include variables that reflect size, structure of activities, 
market share, and the age effect in the modeling of the inefficiency term (specification 
(2)). As the results show, the coefficient on merger remains positive but becomes 
significant. This therefore indicates that M&As are significantly less efficient than 
Greenfields. These results are obtained after controlling for other exogenous factors 
likely to influence X-efficiency. This therefore indicates better management efficiency in 
Greenfields than in M&As. 
 
Regarding the other determinants of inefficiency, we find the same relationship as 
discussed earlier, between size and inefficiency: bigger banks tend t o  b e  m o r e  c o s t  
efficient. On the other hand, the positive and significant coefficient on shareinv suggests 
that banks with a higher proportion of investment assets over loans are more cost 
inefficient. The negative and significant coefficient on sharedep indicates that the larger 
the share of deposits over total funding, the less inefficient the bank is. The coefficient on  22
sharemar is positive but insignificant, suggesting that market share does not play a 
significant role in explaining differences in efficiency of banks. These results are perhaps 
not surprising since the operations and areas of activities of Greenfield banks are 
somewhat different from M&As and these two categories of banks are not trying to 
compete away market shares.  
 
The adjustment process of M&As through time shows in the age-related variables. We 
calculate the natural logarithm of a bank’s age in order to take into account an eventual 
nonlinear effect of age on bank efficiency
15. We interact merger with lnage in an attempt 
to understand the evolution in the efficiency of M&As. The significantly negative 
coefficient on merglnage  suggests that older M&As tend to be more cost efficient. 
Indeed, the older the M&As get, the more likely it is they will have got rid of many of the 
problems inherited from the acquired domestic banks. In contrast, the positive coefficient 
on lnage suggests that as Greenfields grow older, they tend to become less cost-efficient.   
 
We also report the efficiency scores averaged across the two modes of entry. As is 
evident, average efficiency scores of Greenfields surpass those of M&As. 
 
The superior performance of Greenfields is documented by Majnoni et al (2003) for 
Hungary. According to these authors, Greenfields achieve higher profitability than 
restructured ones, and that this is due to the introduction of new financial products. Clark 
et al (2003b) note that in Hungary, empirical evidence suggests that fully privatized 
banks perform better than state owned banks. The evidence also supports the argument in 
the broader privatization literature that privatized enterprises often do not perform as well 
as de novo private firms. De novo foreign banks in Hungary are much smaller but 
perform better than acquired banks and the lesson for policy makers is that it can be more 
difficult to try to improve an acquired public bank than setting up a good performer from 
scratch.  
 
Our findings on the superior cost performance of Greenfields also lends some support to 
the theoretical literature on international M&As, which suggests that systematic 
differences in affiliate performance can emerge between entry modes (Bertrand et al, 
2007).  
6.3 M&As versus Domestic Banks 
As is the case with Greenfields versus M&As, we run regressions for a separate sample 
composed solely of Greenfields and M&As. The regressions results are shown in table 6 
(1) and (2). 
 
The same reasoning applies as in the case of Greenfields versus M&As. We first include 
only the mode of entry dummy, i.e. merger in the modeling of the inefficiency term 
(specification (1)). The result shows a negative although not significant coefficient on 
                                                 
15 At first, we controlled for nonlinear effect of the age on bank efficiency by including the age variable and 
its square value in the inefficiency model. However, such model doesn’t converge. Therefore, we have 
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merger, which might be an indication that M&A banks are more efficient than domestic 
banks. 
 
In a next step, we include variables that reflect size, structure of activities, market share, 
and the age effect in the modeling of the inefficiency term (specification (2)). Again, we 
obtain a coefficient on merger that is negative and insignificant. We therefore conclude 
that no cost efficiency difference is apparent between these two types of banks. 
 
The size variable still suggests that bigger banks tend to be more cost efficient. The 
market share variable is significant and suggests that higher market share tends to lead to 
higher cost inefficiency. 
 
We are particularly interested in the age variables, and the result shows a strong age 
effect with respect to M&As. Indeed, the evolution of M&As’ efficiency follows an 
inverse U-shape, which means that M&As tend to get more inefficient following the 
acquisition, but approximately 4 years and a haft later, their efficiency levels start to 
improve. 
6.4 Checks of Robustness 
As we have made clear in section 4, each approach in modeling inefficiency in the one-
stage setting has its own weaknesses. To make sure our results are not affected by the 
type of model adopted, in this section, we estimate the heteroskedasticity model for a 
check of robustness.  
 
Results for foreign versus domestic banks are reported in table 4(2). A comparison of the 
two models shows that, in essence, the way we model the inefficiency term only affect 
the magnitude of the differences in the inefficiency between the two types of banks, but 
not their signs and significances.  
 
Results for greenfield banks versus M&As are shown in table 5 (3) and (4). As we can 
observe, most results are similar to those of the conditional mean model, except the 
coefficient on sharedep. 
 
Results for greenfield banks versus M&As are shown in table 6 (3) and (4). The results 
differ between the two types of model on the signs of merger, but in all the two cases, the 
coefficients are not significant. This therefore reinforces our conclusion that not cost 
efficiency discrepancy is apparent between M&As and domestic banks.  
7. Conclusions   
 
Previous studies on foreign bank entry often fail to provide evidence on the impact of 
entry modes on efficiency levels. This is often due to the unavailability of adequate data 
to track the ownership of banks. This paper bridges this gap and uses stochastic frontier 
analysis to do this exercise for foreign-owned banks in three transition economies that 
have seen a dramatic rise in participation of foreign banks in their economies. In a one- 24
stage setting, we estimate a conditional mean model along the lines of Battese and Coelli 
(1995) to model inefficiency. First, we confirm the findings of the empirical literature to 
date on transition and emerging countries, namely that foreign banks display a superior 
performance to their domestic peers. In a comparison of the performance of foreign banks 
that entered through two modes of entry - greenfield investment and mergers and 
acquisitions - we find that Greenfields are in fact more cost efficient than M&As.  
 
In an attempt to explore age effects to allow for the M&As to adjust and restructure its 
operations after acquisition, we find evidence of a strong age effect with respect to 
M&As which suggests that the evolution of M&As’ efficiency follows an inverse U-
shape. In other words, M&As tend to become more inefficient following the acquisition, 
but approximately 4 years and a half later, their efficiency begins to improve. 
 
An area that is under-researched in this literature is the ability to take into account 
different types of customers of banks to reflect the different customer focus of foreign 
and domestic banks, especially by separating banks into wholesale and retail banking. As 
Nikiel & Opiela ( 2002) have shown, this may have an important impact on bank 
efficiency and needs to be accounted for.   25
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Table 1: Definitions of variables 
 
Symbol Description  Source  of  data 
Ownership and modes of entry 
foreign  A dummy variable equal to 1 if the bank is a foreign-owned 
bank, and 0 otherwise. 
R.d. Haas, I.v. 
Lelyveld & authors' 
own  research. 
merger  A dummy variable equal to 1 if the bank is a foreign-owned 
bank that enters through a merger and/or an acquisition of a 
domestic bank, and 0 otherwise. 
R.d. Haas, I.v. 
Lelyveld & authors' 
own  research. 
greenfield  A dummy variable equal to 1 if the bank enters a domestic 
market through a greenfield investment. 
R.d. Haas, I.v. 
Lelyveld & authors' 
own  research. 
Variables related to the cost function 
C  Total costs; sum of personnel expenses, interest paid, and other 
non-interest expenses. 
BankScope. 
y  Outputs; sum of y1 and y2.  
y1  Loans. BankScope. 
y2  Investment assets.  BankScope. 
p1  Price of labor; equal to personnel expenses divided by total 
assets. 
BankScope. 
p2  Price of physical capital; equal to other non-interest expenses 
divided by fixed assets. 
BankScope. 
p3  Price of borrowed funds; equal to interest paid divided by all 
funding. 
BankScope. 
equity  Equity of the bank; reflects its risk preferences.  BankScope. 
country  Country dummies.   
time  Time dummies. 
 
 
Determinants of inefficiency 
lnassets  Natural  logarithm of total assets; denotes the size of the bank.  BankScope. 
shareinv  Ratio of investment assets over loans; denotes the structure of 
assets of the bank. 
BankScope. 
sharedep  Ratio of deposits and short term funding to total funding; 
denotes the structure of liabilities of the bank. 
BankScope. 
sharemar  Share of a bank’s assets over total banking system’s assets; 
denotes a bank’s market share 
BankScope. 
age  Number of years since the incorporation of the bank, except first 
year; denotes the age of the bank. 
BankScope. 
lnage  Natural logarithm of age. BankScope. 
agesq  Square of age. BankScope. 
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Table 2: Number of Banks by Ownership and Mode of Entry 
    1994       1995       1996    
  domestic greenfield mergers Total domestic greenfield mergers Total domestic greenfield mergers Total 
Czech  6  5   11  6  5   11  8  5   13 
Hungary  5  3   8  6  3   9  6  5  1  12 
  Poland  12  2   14  13  3   16  18  3   21 
Total  23  10     33  25  11     36  32  13  1  46 
    1997       1998       1999    
  domestic greenfield mergers Total domestic greenfield mergers Total domestic greenfield mergers Total 
Czech 8  9    17  10 10  2  22  10 10  4  24 
Hungary  6  6  2 14  4  9  9 22  4  11  9 24 
  Poland  24  6  3 33  22  13  4 39  22  14  4 40 
Total  38  21  5 64  36  32  15 83  36  35  17 88 
    2000       2001       2002    
  domestic greenfield mergers Total domestic greenfield mergers Total domestic greenfield mergers Total 
Czech  10  10  5 25  8  9  7 24  6  9  9 24 
Hungary  3  12  9 24  3  10  8 21  3  11  8 22 
  Poland  18  14  8 40  13  16  8 37  10  17  10 37 
Total  31  36  22 89  24  35  23 82  19  37  27 83 
    2003       2004           
  domestic greenfield mergers Total domestic greenfield mergers Total       
Czech  6  9  9 24  6  9  8 23        
Hungary  2  11  7 20  1  13  7 21        
  Poland  11  17  12 40  11  16  11 38        
Total  19  37  28 84  18  38  26 82         31
Table 3: Summary Statistics 
  Domestic   Greenfield   M&As   Foreign  
  Mean S.D.  Mean S.D.  Mean S.D.  Mean S.D. 
Outputs
a            
Loans  947.26 1693.97  356.89  507.33 1721.15 2103.16  833.94 1460.11 
Investment  Assets    1063.46 1989.18  303.05  348.23 1953.01 3081.52  880.01 2001.61 
Inputs
a            
Personnel  Expenses  35.13 77.34  6.38  9.11 50.49 72.62 21.65 48.10 
Other  non-Interest  Expenses  57.55  130.03  13.14 21.37 75.45  101.02 34.85 68.71 
Interest  Paid  149.45 256.24  38.19  46.90 156.68 164.41  79.12 117.98 
Prices of Inputs
b            
Price  of  Labor  1.58 1.23  1.19 1.30 1.20 0.87 1.19 1.16 
Price  of  Capital  153.14 457.47  378.23 611.72 175.53 346.80 307.28 542.43 
Price  of  Borrowed  Funds  13.36  80.60  7.91 8.88 6.15 4.11  7.3  7.6 
Notes:
aIn millions dollars; 
b In percentage. 
- Summary Statistics of Variables Related to the Cost Function - 
 
  Domestic    Greenfield  M&As    Foreign   
  Mean  S.D.  Mean  S.D.  Mean  S.D.  Mean  S.D. 
Total Assets
a  2301.07  4062.54  719.27  859.45 4093.75 5506.63  1899.25  3692.7 
Investment Assets/ Loans
b  2.46  6.92  1.57  3.09  1.52  1.89  1.55  2.72 
Deposits/ Total Funding
b  0.94  0.19  0.96  0.08  0.97  0.04  0.96  0.06 
Market Share of Assets
b  0.06  0.09  0.02  0.03  0.06  0.06  0.03  0.04 
Age
c  8.01  3.20  7.09  3.90  4.37  3.25  6.14  3.90 
Notes:
a In millions dollars; 
b In proportion; 
c In years. 
- Summary Statistics of the Determinants of Inefficiency -  32
Table 4: Determinants of Cost Inefficiency – Foreign versus Domestic Banks 
 
  (1) (2) 
Dependent variable:  
cost inefficiency 
Conditional  Mean  Model  Heteroskedasticity Model 
lnassets  -.652 -1.131 
  (.132)*** (.149)*** 
shareinv  .025 
(.008)*** 
.076 
(.023)*** 
sharedep  -.179 
(.404) 
.574 
(.752) 
foreign  -.306 
(.135)*** 
-.429  
(.183)*** 
constant  3.44 
(.668)*** 
3.683 
(.927)*** 
Observations 732  732 
Log likelihood  79.845  56.024 
Mean efficiency scores     
Foreign banks  0.78  0.84 
Domestic banks  0.74  0.80  33
 
Table 5: Determinants of Cost Inefficiency – Greenfield versus M&A Banks 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Dependent 
variable: cost 
inefficiency 
Conditional 
Mean Model 
(1) 
Conditional 
Mean Model 
(2) 
Heteroskedasticity 
Model (1)
b 
Heteroskedasticity 
Model (2)
b 
merger  53.981
a 
(38.367) 
.699  
(.169)*** 
.026 
(.179) 
17.060  
(2.678)*** 
lnassets   -.383   
(.073)*** 
 .336   
(.241) 
shareinv   .043   
(.010)*** 
 .142   
(.065)** 
sharedep   -1.090 
(.340)*** 
 6.918   
(2.358)*** 
sharemar   2.002   
(1.678) 
 -4.675   
(4.469) 
lnage   .105   
(.053)** 
 6.440   
(1.058)*** 
merglnage   -.241   
(.089)** 
 -6.650   
(.994)*** 
Constant  -266.209 
(115.307)*** 
3.038 
(.497)*** 
-1.879 
(.124)*** 
-28.759
c 
 
Observations 441  438  441  438 
Log likelihood  58.874  138.595  16.779  178.253 
Greenfield 0.84  0.81  0.77  0.96 
M&As 0.79  0.78  0.72  0.80 
*Notes: 
a. This model doesn’t converge. We take the result after 108 iterations, that is after the log likelihood 
stabilizes. 
b. We also control for heteroskedasticity in the random error by incorporating lnassets in the modeling of v. 
c. Missing standard errors are due to Stata not reporting them. 
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Table 6: Determinants of Cost Inefficiency –M&A versus Domestic Banks 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3) (4) 
Dependent 
variable: cost 
inefficiency 
Conditional 
Mean Model (1) 
Conditional 
Mean Model 
(2) 
Heteroskedasticity 
Model (1)
b 
Heteroskedasticity 
Model (2)
b 
merger  -3.334
a 
(36.408) 
-.797  
(.521) 
.076  
(.151) 
3.697  
(2.209)*
 
lnassets   -.414   
(.127)*** 
 -.400   
(.157)*** 
shareinv   .004   
(.009) 
 .087 
 (.031)*** 
sharedep   .325   
(.514) 
 10.429
c 
 
sharemar   3.235 
 (1.451)** 
 6.961   
(2.040)*** 
age    -.229   
(.096)*** 
 .579   
(.413) 
agesq   .016 
(.006)*** 
 -.008   
(.019) 
mergage   .587   
(.298)** 
 .593   
(.488) 
mergagesq   -.066   
(.034)** 
 -.119   
(.035)*** 
Constant  -299.304 
(201.359)*** 
2.443  
(.763)*** 
-2.309  
(.102)*** 
-16.331  
(2.464)*** 
Observations 441  441  441  441 
Log likelihood  82.877  110.951  141.005  196.018 
Mean efficiency scores 
Domestic 0.82
   0.79   
M&As 0.81    0.77   
*Notes: 
a. This model doesn’t converge. We take the result after 242 iterations, that is after the log likelihood 
stabilizes. 
b. We also control for heteroskedasticity in the random error by incorporating lnassets in the modeling of v. 
c. Missing standard errors are due to Stata not reporting them.  35
 
Table 7: Cost Efficiency Parameters Estimates – Foreign versus Domestic Banks 
 (1)  (2) 
  Conditional Mean Model  Heteroskedasticity Model 
Y1 0.888  0.825 
 (0.049)***  (0.058)*** 
Y2 0.491  0.375 
 (0.060)***  (0.063)*** 
P1 0.741  0.818 
 (0.192)***  (0.214)*** 
P2 0.335  0.265 
 (0.018)***  (0.025)*** 
Y1Q 0.096  0.096 
 (0.012)***  (0.016)*** 
Y2Q 0.135  0.137 
 (0.005)***  (0.006)*** 
Y1Y2 -0.133  -0.118 
 (0.009)***  (0.011)*** 
P1Q 0.058  0.489 
 (0.145)  (0.162)*** 
P2Q -0.036  -0.028 
 (0.005)***  (0.005)*** 
P1P2 0.004  -0.041 
 (0.033)  (0.034) 
Y1P1 -0.025  -0.091 
 (0.038)  (0.046)* 
Y1P2 -0.031  -0.024 
 (0.007)***  (0.007)*** 
Y2P1 0.094 0.118 
 (0.040)**  (0.045)*** 
Y2P2 0.006 0.009 
 (0.007)  (0.007) 
LnEQUITY -0.122  -0.240 
 (0.045)***  (0.029)*** 
COUNTRY_2 0.158  0.167 
 (0.020)***  (0.025)*** 
COUNTRY_3 0.094  0.080 
 (0.018)***  (0.022)*** 
YEAR_2 -0.035  -0.034 
 (0.046)  (0.058) 
YEAR_3 -0.048  -0.041 
 (0.043)  (0.056) 
YEAR_4 -0.132  -0.138 
 (0.042)***  (0.052)*** 
YEAR_5 -0.100  -0.078 
 (0.039)**  (0.050) 
YEAR_6 -0.097  -0.072 
 (0.040)**  (0.051) 
YEAR_7 -0.136  -0.122 
 (0.040)***  (0.051)** 
YEAR_8 -0.128  -0.115 
 (0.040)***  (0.052)** 
YEAR_9 -0.124  -0.084 
 (0.042)***  (0.053)  36
YEAR_10 -0.134  -0.071 
 (0.044)***  (0.054) 
YEAR_11 -0.124  -0.059 
 (0.043)***  (0.055) 
Constant -0.442  0.907 
 (0.391)  (0.293)*** 
Observations 732  732 
*Notes: 
1. Y1 = (Ln(Loans)) 
2. Y2 = (Ln(Other Earning Assets)) 
3. P1 = (Ln(Labor Price/Borrowed Fund Price)) 
4. P2 = (Ln(Capital Price/Borrowed Fund Price)) 
5. Standard errors are in parentheses.     
6. *, **, *** denote significances at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively.  37
 
Table 8: Cost Efficiency Parameters Estimates - Greenfield Banks versus M&A 
Banks 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4) 
 Conditional  Mean 
Model (1) 
Conditional Mean 
Model (2) 
Heteroskedasticity 
Model (1) 
Heteroskedasticity 
Model (2) 
Y1  0.753 0.991 0.753  0.419 
  (0.056)*** (0.111)*** (0.053)***  (0.068)*** 
Y2  0.166 0.245 0.155  0.364 
  (0.052)*** (0.079)*** (0.062)**  (0.073)*** 
P1  0.751 0.691 0.679  0.660 
  (0.231)*** (0.243)*** (0.266)**  (0.272)** 
P2 0.074  -0.014  0.124  0.038 
 (0.045)*  (0.046)  (0.051)**  (0.045) 
Y1Q  0.066 0.037 0.085  0.123 
 (0.014)***  (0.022)*  (0.015)***  (0.016)*** 
Y2Q  0.117 0.121 0.120  0.119 
  (0.006)*** (0.006)*** (0.006)***  (0.006)*** 
Y1Y2  -0.081 -0.093 -0.088  -0.104 
  (0.009)*** (0.013)*** (0.009)***  (0.010)*** 
P1Q  0.229 0.638 0.225  0.455 
 (0.189)  (0.208)***  (0.213)  (0.211)** 
P2Q  0.005 0.003 0.006  0.007 
  (0.007) (0.007) (0.008)  (0.005) 
P1P2  -0.023 -0.067 0.003  -0.067 
  (0.035) (0.042) (0.036)  (0.039)* 
Y1P1  -0.023 -0.019 -0.087  0.014 
  (0.049) (0.050) (0.050)*  (0.054) 
Y1P2  -0.025 -0.006 -0.043  0.004 
 (0.009)***  (0.009)  (0.009)***  (0.007) 
Y2P1  0.062 0.055 0.123  0.058 
  (0.048) (0.043) (0.047)***  (0.040) 
Y2P2  0.023 0.020 0.031  -0.004 
  (0.007)*** (0.008)*** (0.008)***  (0.008) 
lnEQUITY  -0.125 -0.073 -0.162  -0.212 
  (0.112) (0.078) (0.133)  (0.093)** 
COUNTRY_2  0.111 0.116 0.097  0.118 
  (0.028)*** (0.025)*** (0.032)***  (0.020)*** 
COUNTRY_3  0.013 0.110 -0.017  0.131 
 (0.030)  (0.028)***  (0.035)  (0.024)*** 
YEAR_2  -0.011 -0.057 -0.004  0.003 
  (0.082) (0.081) (0.091)  (0.077) 
YEAR_3  -0.030 -0.071 -0.022  -0.000 
  (0.081) (0.076) (0.089)  (0.075) 
YEAR_4  -0.034 -0.078 -0.036  -0.053 
  (0.073) (0.072) (0.082)  (0.072) 
YEAR_5  -0.013 -0.081 0.009  -0.040 
  (0.069) (0.070) (0.075)  (0.070) 
YEAR_6 0.017  -0.035  0.021  -0.010 
  (0.068) (0.069) (0.075)  (0.069) 
YEAR_7  -0.039 -0.091 -0.045  -0.052 
  (0.068) (0.069) (0.076)  (0.070) 
YEAR_8  -0.033 -0.073 -0.049  -0.061 
  (0.069) (0.071) (0.077)  (0.070)  38
YEAR_9  -0.004 -0.030 -0.029  -0.027 
  (0.071) (0.073) (0.080)  (0.070) 
YEAR_10 0.001  -0.001  -0.015  -0.047 
  (0.072) (0.073) (0.080)  (0.071) 
YEAR_11  -0.002 -0.010 -0.023  -0.060 
  (0.071) (0.072) (0.079)  (0.071) 
Constant  1.469 0.130 1.557  2.665 
 (0.810)*  (0.690)  (0.964)  (0.696)*** 
Observations  441 438 441  438 
*Notes: 
1. Y1 = (Ln(Loans)) 
2. Y2 = (Ln(Other Earning Assets)) 
3. P1 = (Ln(Labor Price/Borrowed Fund Price)) 
4. P2 = (Ln(Capital Price/Borrowed Fund Price)) 
5. Standard errors are in parentheses.     
6. *, **, *** denote significances at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively.  39
 
Table 9: Cost Efficiency Parameters Estimates - M&A versus Domestic Banks 
 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4) 
 Conditional  Mean 
Model (1) 
Conditional Mean 
Model (2) 
Heteroskedasticity 
Model (1) 
Heteroskedasticity 
Model (2) 
Y1 0.696  0.797  0.473  0.459 
  (0.054)*** (0.079)*** (0.045)***  (0.050)*** 
Y2 0.287  0.422  0.294  0.325 
  (0.048)*** (0.078)*** (0.036)***  (0.043)*** 
P1 0.705  1.213  0.804  1.127 
  (0.262)*** (0.293)*** (0.231)***  (0.234)*** 
P2 0.421  0.385  -0.053  -0.046 
  (0.023)*** (0.025)*** (0.023)**  (0.042) 
Y1Q 0.161  0.162  0.186  0.172 
  (0.010)*** (0.018)*** (0.009)***  (0.010)*** 
Y2Q 0.207  0.205  0.201  0.192 
  (0.011)*** (0.012)*** (0.008)***  (0.010)*** 
Y1Y2  -0.174 -0.189 -0.172  -0.164 
  (0.009)*** (0.012)*** (0.007)***  (0.009)*** 
P1Q 0.626  0.161  0.038  -0.029 
 (0.222)***  (0.270)  (0.288) (0.183) 
P2Q  -0.054 -0.034 0.022  0.028 
  (0.008)*** (0.008)*** (0.004)***  (0.007)*** 
P1P2  -0.097 -0.074 0.015  -0.028 
 (0.052)*  (0.055)  (0.028) (0.035) 
Y1P1  -0.079 -0.091 -0.071  0.012 
  (0.031)** (0.043)** (0.036)**  (0.040) 
Y1P2  -0.025 -0.024 -0.001  0.005 
 (0.009)***  (0.010)**  (0.005) (0.009) 
Y2P1 0.154  0.123  0.132  0.012 
 (0.045)***  (0.054)**  (0.038)***  (0.046) 
Y2P2  -0.004 -0.006 0.008  0.004 
  (0.009) (0.009) (0.004)* (0.008) 
lnEQUITY  -0.184 -0.176 -0.275  -0.214 
  (0.064)*** (0.047)*** (0.039)***  (0.027)*** 
COUNTRY_2 0.171  0.185  0.241  0.139 
  (0.032)*** (0.030)*** (0.018)***  (0.024)*** 
COUNTRY_3 0.143  0.133  0.192  0.092 
  (0.029)*** (0.028)*** (0.023)***  (0.023)*** 
YEAR_2  -0.034 -0.029 -0.060  -0.076 
  (0.051) (0.054) (0.025)**  (0.036)** 
YEAR_3  -0.033 -0.023 -0.034  -0.079 
  (0.049) (0.052) (0.022)  (0.036)** 
YEAR_4  -0.180 -0.141 -0.173  -0.123 
  (0.049)*** (0.051)*** (0.038)***  (0.036)*** 
YEAR_5  -0.142 -0.101 -0.182  -0.102 
 (0.046)***  (0.049)**  (0.038)***  (0.034)*** 
YEAR_6  -0.117 -0.098 -0.114  -0.135 
 (0.046)**  (0.050)*  (0.030)***  (0.037)*** 
YEAR_7  -0.126 -0.103 -0.101  -0.149 
 (0.046)***  (0.050)**  (0.034)***  (0.037)*** 
YEAR_8  -0.117 -0.121 -0.135  -0.153 
  (0.048)** (0.051)** (0.041)*** (0.041)***  40
YEAR_9  -0.119 -0.122 -0.065  -0.165 
  (0.051)** (0.052)** (0.044)  (0.043)*** 
YEAR_10  -0.119 -0.121 -0.090  -0.173 
  (0.052)** (0.054)** (0.044)**  (0.044)*** 
YEAR_11  -0.133 -0.113 -0.110  -0.176 
  (0.054)** (0.054)** (0.044)**  (0.045)*** 
Constant 1.270  0.300  2.919  2.716 
 (0.473)***  (0.478)  (0.291)***  (0.266)*** 
Observations  441 441 441  441 
*Notes: 
1. Y1 = (Ln(Loans)) 
2. Y2 = (Ln(Other Earning Assets)) 
3. P1 = (Ln(Labor Price/Borrowed Fund Price)) 
4. P2 = (Ln(Capital Price/Borrowed Fund Price)) 
5. Standard errors are in parentheses.     
6. *, **, *** denote significances at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
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